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In Reason’s Debt to Freedom, Ishtiyaque Haji presents a surprising, innovative, and
rigorous contribution to the debate over free will and moral responsibility. The central
thesis of this book is that a certain kind of reason – a pro tanto reason – requires free will,
or the ability to do otherwise. Pro tanto reasons are reasons that can be outweighed or
overridden and can be contrasted with all-things-considered reasons, which by contrast
cannot be outweighed.
Haji refrains from taking a stance as to whether this ability to do otherwise
requires strong alternatives of the kind advocated by incompatibilists who believe free
will is incompatible with determinism, or weak alternatives of the kind advocated by
some compatibilists who believe free will is compatible with determinism, where
determinism is the theory that the actual past, coupled with the laws of nature, completely
determines only one possible future. However, in chapter 6, Haji notes that the
traditional compatibilist accounts of weak alternatives have had their shortcomings.
Seeking to avoid the thorny issue of weak alternatives, some philosophers—semicompatibilists—contend that moral responsibility does not require free will or alternative
possibilities of any kind. Semi-compatibilists have relied upon thought experiments,
such as Frankfurt-style cases, to demonstrate the intuitive plausibility of their theories.
Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be uncontroversially morally
responsible for an action despite being unable to do otherwise. Black wants Jones to kill
his neighbor and is reasonably sure that Jones will do so on his own; however, Black
doesn’t want to take any chances and he implants Jones with a device designed to force
Jones to kill his neighbor that will trigger only if Jones begins a deliberation process that
would lead him to choose otherwise.
While semi-compatibilists argue moral responsibility doesn’t require free will,
they do not argue against the close relationship between moral responsibility and having
reasons. Haji affirms the theory that moral responsibility requires control of some kind.
For semi-compatibilists, the control required for moral responsibility constitutes having
certain reasons, including pro tanto reasons, that causally determine our actions in an
appropriate way. By demonstrating that objective pro tanto reasons require the existence
of alternate possibilities, Haji is able to offer a substantive criticism of semicompatibilism without having to offer a deeper analysis of where Frankfurt-style cases go
awry.
Haji’s criticism of semi-compatibilism is innovative, but I fear it ignores two
substantial debates concerning moral responsibility: (1) the question of robustness, and (2)
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the moral luck debate. Harry Frankfurt contends that his case is a counterexample to the
principle of alternate possibilities even if it doesn’t truly cut them off; it is sufficient to
show that alternate possibilities do not play any role in explaining the agent’s moral
culpability. Derk Pereboom and David Hunt have similarly constructed neo-Frankfurtstyle cases that purport to deny an agent robust alternate possibilities. In Frankfurt’s
original case, Jones can be said to have robust alternate possibilities because the device is
triggered when he begins a deliberation that would lead to him choosing not to kill his
neighbor; critics of Frankfurt-style cases argue this is a prima facie praiseworthy act that
explains why he would be blameless were the device to trigger. In neo-Frankfurt-style
cases, the agent in question has decided to do some heinous act but would normally have
the ability to reconsider her choice through some indeterministic decision making process;
however the agent is implanted with a device that is set to trigger the moment she so
much as imagines that she can refrain from the heinous act. Proponents of these cases
argue that this trigger is not robust enough to make the agent differently morally
responsible for the heinous act, were the device to trigger or not. For Haji, it is not clear
whether a genuine objective pro tanto reason would cease to be a pro tanto reason if a
neo-Frankfurt-style case device was present. If whether something is a pro tanto reason
depends upon whether a device has been implanted, then it is a matter of luck, seemingly
undermining the control requirement; if not, then one can have an objective pro tanto
reason without having alternate possibilities.
The problem of moral luck is that it makes sense to say that we are morally
responsible for many things that are outside of our control, such as the consequences of
our actions. For example, we might hold Jones morally responsible for killing his
neighbor even if it is ultimately outside of his control whether or not he succeeds; for
example he could have shot his neighbor, but it is a matter of luck - outside of his control
- that the gun didn’t backfire. One solution to the problem of moral luck is to adopt a
distinction between moral responsibility and derivative moral responsibility, where to be
derivatively morally responsible for y is to be morally responsible for x, where x is
conceptually connected to y in an appropriate way. While it doesn’t make sense to say
that we are truly morally responsible for the consequences of our actions because they are
largely determined by circumstances outside of our control, it does make sense to say that
we are derivatively morally responsible for them in many cases because we are said to be
in complete control of our intentional choices, and there is often a regular connection
between our intentions and the outcomes of our actions. Despite the rigor with which
Haji approaches his discussion of reasons and moral responsibility, his analysis still
asserts that moral agents are morally responsible for the consequences of their actions—
what they do—rather than what they intend to do, despite these consequences being a
matter of luck. In doing so, Haji threatens to undermine the connection between moral
responsibility and control that is central to his criticism of semi-compatibilism.
In spite of this, it is uncontroversially true that this book presents a rigorous,
original, and well-thought out argument against semi-compatibilism; pro tanto reasons of
the kind it is generally accepted are necessary for moral responsibility require alternate
possibilities – free will – either strong alternatives of the kind incompatible with
determinism, or weak alternatives of the kind compatibilists sometimes advocate. Haji
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has made a strong and long-lasting contribution to the free will debate that all
philosophers working in the field should read.
William Simkulet
Friends University
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